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Abstract 
We  formulate  the  Dempster-Shafer  formalism  of  belief 
functions  [Shafer  761  in  the  spirit  of  logical  inference 
systems.  Our  formulation  (called  the  belief  calculus) 
explicitly  avoids  the  use  of  set-theoretic  notations.  As 
such,  it  serves  as  an  alternative  for  the  use  of  the 
Dempster-Shafer  formalism  for uncertain reasoning. 
I.  Pntroduction 
Traditionally,  the  “syntax”  of the Dempster-Shafer  (D- 
S) formalism  [Shafer  761 has been  set-theoretic  in nature 
(e.g.,  [Gordon  and  Shortliffe  84;  Kong  86;  Shafer  et al. 
87; Yen  891).  In some  cases,  propositions  may  be  used 
for  belief  specifications  (e.g.,  [Smets  88;  Zarley  et  al. 
881).  However,  to date,  there  is no purely  logic-oriented 
formulation  of this formalism. 
Set-theoretic  notations  are  appropriate  when  we  are 
concerned  with  general  theory  rather  than  applications. 
But  on  the  other  hand,  we might  also  find  it difficult  to 
use  set-theoretic  notations  in some  application  domains. 
To  overcome  this  notational  disadvantage  of  the  D-S 
formalism,  we  give  an alternative  formulation  of  belief 
functions  in this paper.  Our formulation  (called the belief 
calculus)  is developed  along the lines of natural deduction 
systems,  and  it explicitly  avoids  the  use of  set-theoretic 
notations.  This  differs  from  the  previous  research 
wuspini  87;  Fagin  and  Halpern  891 in  which  the  main 
concern  was  the  “structure”  or  semantics  of  the  D-S 
formalism  and not its syntax. 
To  show  how  the  belief  calculus  may  be  used  for 
uncertain  reasoning,  we  give  three  examples.  These 
examples  model  different  real  world  situations,  and  they 
address issues such as independent random variables, belief 
dependency  structures, and “distinct” sources of evidence. 
The remainder  of this paper  is organized  as follows.  In 
Section  2, we describe  the  belief  calculus.  In Section  3, 
we  show  how  the  belief  calculus  may  be  used  for 
uncertain  reasoning.  In  Section  4,  we  discuss  some 
related  issues.  Finally,  Section  5 concludes. 
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2.  The  Belief  Calculus 
The  multivariate  formalism.  Our  formulation  of 
the D-S formalism  starts with the multivariate  formalism 
[Kong  861.  That  is, we assume  that  different  aspects  of 
the  world  that  are  of  interests  to  us  are  already 
appropriately  formulated  as questions  or variables  (e.g., 
“Is the entity  capable  of flying?“,  “Can the object  be used 
to  cross  the  river?”  etc).  Each  of  these  variables  is 
associated  with a set of mutually  exclusive  and exhaustive 
values  (called  the frame  of  the variable)  representing  all 
possible  answers  to the question.  A booZean variable  is 
one that has an associated frame of  (Yes, No}. 
Propositions.  Primitive  propositions  (i.e.,  atoms)  are 
of  the  form  “SomeVariable  =  SomeValue”.  From 
propositions,  we build  compound  propositions  using five 
logical  connectives  (with the usual semantics):  1  (not), v 
(or), A (and), +  (if . . . then),  H  (if and only if). 
As a basic  requirement  of  the  multivariate  formalism, 
we  assume  that,  for  every  variable  and  its  associated 
frame,  there  is a corresponding  mutual exclusion  axiom. 
For  example,  if the frame  of  the  variable  A is  {h, m, I}, 
then  the  mutual  exclusion  axiom  associated  with  A and 
its frame is ‘((A = h) A +A  = m) A -(A  = 1)) v  (l(A  = h) 
A (A = m) A  T(A  = 1)) v  (T(A  = h)  A  T(A  = m) A  (A = 
1))‘. We use ME  to denote  the set of all mutual  exclusion 
axioms.  For  convenience;  we  also  use  ‘A’ as  an 
abbreviation  for  ‘A =  Yes’  whenever  A  is  a  boolean 
variable  (and ‘-A’ will be logically  equivalent  to ‘A = No’ 
under ME). 
Let  Al,  AZ, . . . , AN be all variables,  and  let  01,02, 
. . .  , 0~  be  their  respective  frames.  A valuation  is an 
assignment  of  an  element  of  0;  (1 I  i I  N)  to  Ai  for 
every  i  (i.e.,  an  assignment  of  a  value-vector  to  the 
variable-vector  <Ai,  AZ, . . . , AN>).  A proposition  P is 
said  to be  true  under  a valuation  V if P is true  when  all 
variables  occurring  in  P  are  replaced  with  their 
corresponding  values in V; otherwise  P is said to be false 
under V. 
Formally,  a valuation  is  defined  as  an  assignment  of 
values  to all  variables.  But  when  the  situation  permits, 
we  also  use  the  word  ‘valuation’  to  mean  a  (partial) 
valuation  of all variables  occurring  in some proposition. 
From: AAAI-90 Proceedings. Copyright ©1990, AAAI (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved. Example  1.  “(PLACE  = Africa)  4  (TEMP  = high)”  is 
a proposition.  It is  false  under  the  valuation  <PLACE, 
TEMp>  = <Africa,  medium>  and true under the valuation 
<PLACE,  TEMP>  = <Europe,  medium>. 
A contingent  proposition,  then,  is a proposition  that is 
true under one valuation  but false under another  valuation. 
A va2id proposition  (or  tautology),  denoted  as  ‘T’, is a 
proposition  that  is  true  under  every  valuation,  while  an 
unsatisj?able proposition,  denoted  as ‘F’, is a proposition 
that  is  false  under  every  valuation  (and  a  satisfiable 
proposition  is true under at least one valuation). 
Beliefs 
format: 
i.  A belief  is a formula  specified  in the following 
Pl  N-4)  V  P2  b2)  V  . . .  V  Pn  0%) 
where 
V i (1 I  i I  n),  Pi is a satisfiable  proposition 
andO<m;Il, 
andCmi=  1.  (1) 
As  a  convention,  if  ‘T’ appears  in  formula  (l),  it  is 
usually  specified  at the end (i.e., as Pn).  “T (1)” is called 
the vacuous belief. 
Intuitively,  each  mi  (called  the  “m-value”  of  Pi)  in 
formula (1) represents  the amount of belief we specifically 
“allocate”  to Pi.  That  is, formula  (1) may be interpreted 
to mean the following:  the world,  as we understand  it, is 
such  that  P1 holds  (with  the  amount  of  belief  ml  being 
allocated  to it), or P2 holds (with the amount of belief  m2 
being allocated  to it), .  .  .  . or Pn holds  (with  the remaining 
amount  of  belief  mn being  allocated  to it).  This  is why 
we use the symbol  ‘V’  to delimit  the ‘Pi (mi)’ of a belief. 
However,  this  symbol  ‘v’  is not  to be confused  with the 
usual logical  symbol  ‘v’ that occurs  within a proposition. 
In the  following,  we  use  the  term  ‘intuitive  belief  (or 
‘intuitive beliefs’) to denote  the intuitive  belief(s)  we have 
in mind, and we also use the word  ‘belief  (or ‘beliefs’) to 
denote a formula  (or formulas). 
Belief  sets.  We  may  be  able  to  come  up  with  one 
single  belief  (i.e.,  one  formula)  which  appropriately 
formalizes  our  intuitive  belief  in  (almost)  every  way. 
However,  this  is not  a very  easy  task  in general,  and  it 
may  be  argued  whether  the  specification  of  such  a joint 
belief is always necessary. 
As  human  problem  solvers,  we  are  often  capable  of 
identifying  various  “independent”  aspects  of  a problem. 
Once  such  aspects  have  been  identified,  we  can  then 
specify  a (unique)  belief  for each of these aspects and use 
some  kind  of  inference  mechanism  to  “combine”  the 
specified  (independent)  beliefs.  This  philosophy  is 
embodied  in the D-S formalism.  Accordingly,  the belief 
calculus  works  with  sets  of  beliefs  (called  belief  sets)l; 
when  using  this  calculus  for  reasoning,  we  first  try  to 
l with singleton  sets  as special  cases. 
infer a singleton set (containing  the combined  belief)  from 
the given belief  set. 
A  belief  set  IB  is  a  non-empty  set  of  beliefs.  In 
notation, 
IB = (bl;  b2; . . . ; br), where 
r 2  1, and V i (1 5 i 5 r), bi is a belief. 
(We  use  ‘;’ to  delimit  the  specified  beliefs.  This 
specification  of beliefs  does not mean  that the beliefs  are 
implicitly ordered.) 
We now give the inference  rules of the belief  calculus2. 
The  first  three  rules  are  trivial.  (Notation:  Throughout 
this paper,  we use ‘I-  P’ to mean that “the proposition  P is 
provable  in  the  propositional  calculus  from  the  set  of 
mutual  exclusion  axioms  MB”.) 
1. Commutation: 
I...  V  Pi (mi)  V  .  .  .  V  Pj (mj)  V  .  .  .  . b2; b3; . . . ; br) 
(...  V  Pj  (mj)  V  .  .  .  V  Pi (mi)  V  .  .  .  . b2; b3; . . . ; br) 
2. Addition: 
I- P  ++ W, 
{...  V  P (mi)  V  . . . V  R (mj)  V  .  . .  . b2; 
(...  V  P (mi + mj)  V  .  .  .  V  .  .  .  . b2; b3; . . . ; br} 
3.  Substitution: 
I- 0,  tj  R),  {  . . .  V  P (m)  V  . . . ; b2; b3; . . . ; br) 
{ .  .  .  V  R (m)  V  . . . ; b2; b3; . . . ; br} 
We  also  need  a  fourth  rule  for  inferring  combined 
beliefs  (0  is defined below). 
4.  Combination3: 
(bl;  b2; b3; . . . ; br),  bl  Q b2 = 
{bc;  b3; --- ; h-1 
The  combination  operator  6.  Let  @  denote  the  set 
of  all  beliefs.  The  combination  operator  8  (read  as 
“Dempster’s combination”)  is a partial  function  that maps 
from  Ffl  x ?Jl to $8. 
Intuitively,  0  (e.g.,  (A  (.8)  V  (lA)  (.2))  0  (A  (S)  v 
B  (.3)  V  T  (.2)))  may  be  thought  of  as  a  two  step 
process. 
The first step is to apply the (independence)  assumption 
that allocating  pi to Pi in the first belief  and  allocating  rj 
to Rj in the second  belief  should  mean  allocating  pi*rj  to 
2The  belief  calculus  is  formulated  along  the lines  of  natural 
deduction  systems.  However,  due  to  space  limitations,  we 
only describe the inference mechanism  of  this system. 
3This  is  the only  inference  rule  (in  the context  of  the belief 
calculus)  that can be used to reduce the number of beliefs in a 
belief  set. 
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A  B) (.24)  V  (A A  ‘I’)  (.16)  V  (-A  A  A) (.l)  V  (-A  A  B) 
(.oQ  v  (1A  A T) CW)). 
The second  step is to apply  the (coherence)  assumption 
that the two beliefs  that are being  combined  are meant to 
be  coherent;  this  is  done  by  taking  away  all  “pairs” 
containing  unsatisfiable  propositions  (e.g., (TA  A  A) (.l)) 
and  redistributing  their  m-values  (e.g.,  .l)  to  the 
remaining  propositions  by  proportions  (e.g.,  ((A  A  A) 
(.444)  V  (A A  B)  (267)  V  (A  A  T)  (.178)  V  (-A  A  B) 
(.067)  V ‘(7A  A  T)  (.O44))).  This  step is also known  as 
“renormalization”. 
Formally,  0  is defined  as follows.  (Notation:  Let  S 
be  an ordered  set  of  “pairs”  (Pi  (ml),  P;? (mz),  . ..,  Pn 
(m&J,  then  by  ‘V S’, we  mean  the  formula  ‘Pi  (ml)  V 
P2 (m2)  V  . . .  V  Pn (mn)‘.) 
(pl  (Pl)  v  p2  (p2)  v  l --  v  PM  (PM))  @ 
@I  61)  V  R2  (r2)  V  .  . . V  RN  0~)) 
= 
if 3 (i, j)  E  (1,  . . .  . M)x  (1,  . . . . N} 
such that Pi A  Rj is satisfiable, 
then 
Example  3.  BEL( ((A  +  B) (1)))  B) = 0. 
Example  4. 
V  {(Pi  A Rj)  @i*rj  /  (1  -  z(h,k&  sPh*rlc))  I 
S is the maximum  subset  of 
{L  -a-, M}x(  1, . . . . N)  such that 
b’ (h,k)  E  S, I- ((ph  A  Rk) H  F), 
and 
(A (.8) v  (1A)  (.2);  A (.5) v  B (.3) v  T (.2)) 
I-DS ((A  A  A) (444)  V  (A A  B) (.267)  V  (A A  T) (.178) 
V  +A  A  B) (.067)  V (-A  A  T) (.O44)) 
(i, j)  E  ((1,  . . . . M)x  (1,  . . . . N))\S 
I4 
I-,,  (A (.444)  V  (A A  B) (.267)  V  A (.178) 
other’wise  undefined. 
V  (--,A  A  B) (.O67) V -,A  (.044)} 
0  is an associative  operation  (i.e.,  (bl  0  b2) @ b3, if 
defined,  is the same as bl  63 (b2 (33  b3 )).  If we use Q  to 
denote  ‘Xl3  without  renormalization”,  then Q  is obviously 
associative;  but  more  importantly,  bl  @ b2 $  . . . $  br 
(whatever  the order  of combinations  is), if defined,  is the 
same  as  bl  Bb2&  . . . Q  br  followed  by  one  single 
renormalization. 
I-DS (A (622)  V  (A A  B) (267)  V  +A  A  B) (.O67) 
v  --,A (044)) 
Therefore 
Addition 
BEL(lB  , A)  = .622  +  .267  =  .889,  and  BEL(IB,  TA)  = 
.067 + .O44 = .lll. 
Also,  r  beliefs  b 1,  b2,  . . . .  br  are  said  to  be 
incompatible  whenever  bl  0  b2 0  . . . 0  br (whatever 
the order of combinations  is) is undefined. 
Example  2.  (A (1)) 0  ((lA)  (1)) is undefined. 
The  calculus.  The  belief  set  IB2  is Dempster-Shafer 
provable from  the belief  set lB  1, denoted  as ‘ll3  1 I-Ds  IB2’, 
if lB2 can be  inferred  from  IB 1 after  a finite  number  of 
applications of the (four) inference  rules. 
We are now ready  to define  the overall  belief BEL in an 
arbitrary  proposition.  Let  %g  be the set of all belief  sets 
and  3  be  the  set  of  all  propositions.  BEL  is  a partial 
Relating  to  the  “usual”  formulation.  To  see  the 
relation  between  the  belief  calculus  and  the  usual  set- 
theoretic  formulation  of  belief  functions  [Shafer  761, 
consider  the  following  mapping:  let  Al,  AZ, . . . , AN be 
all  the  variables,  and  let  01,  02  , . . .  , 0~  be  their 
respective  frames.  Then  each  proposition  P corresponds 
to exactly  one  subset  of  the joint  frame  01  x 02  x  . . .  x 
0~  (i.e.,  the  set  of  all  “total”  valuations  that  make  P 
true).  Similarly,  for each  subset of the joint  frame,  there 
is  a  corresponding  set  of  logically  equivalent 
propositions.  Let  Sp be the subset of the joint  frame  that 
corresponds  to the proposition  P and let SR be the subset 
of  the joint  frame  that  corresponds  to  the proposition  R, 
then:  I- (P  +  R)  if  and  only  if  Sp  c  SR;  Sp  u  SR 
corresponds  to  P  v  R; Sp n  SR  corresponds  to  P  A  R; 
and 01  x  02  x  . . .  x  0~  \  Sp corresponds  to -P.  This 
4We  assume these ‘Pi A Rj’ are lexicographically  ordered in (i, 
j). 
function  from  %I%5  x @ to  [0, 11, defined  as follows  (let 
IB be a belief  set and R be a proposition.) 
BEL(B  3 R)  =  CI-(Pi”R)  mi 
where  IB I-D,  (Pi  (ml)  V P2 (m2)  V  . . . V  Pn (mn)) . 
p  i.e., we must first deduce  a singleton  from  IB */ 
Clearly,  BEL(lB  ,  R)  will  be  undefined  (for  every 
proposition  R)  whenever  the  beliefs  contained  in  lB are 
incompatible. 
Note  that,  even  if  BEL(IB ,  R)  is  defined  for  some 
contingent  proposition  R,  it  can  still  be  zero.  This 
simply  means  that  we  have  no  idea  whether  R  holds  in 
the  world  (because  we  are  not  aware  of  anything  that 
logically  supports  it).  But  having  no (intuitive)  belief  in 
R does not  necessarily  mean that we have  any  (intuitive) 
belief  in TR  (i.e., BEL( lB  , -R)  > 0), because  our degree 
of belief  in a proposition  (-R  in this case),  as defined  by 
BEL,  is always  dependent  on  whether  we  are  aware  of 
anything  that logically  supports  it and not on whether  we 
are ignorant  of anything  supporting  its negation  (i.e., R). 
This is one of the characteristics  of the D-S formalism. 
/*  i.e.,  lB */ 
Combination 
Substitution 
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language  of  the belief  calculus  and  the  language  of  the 
usual set-theoretic  formulation  of belief functions. 
Example  5.  We  now  use  the  belief  calculus  notations 
to describe  the  idea  of  combining  the  ATMS  [de  Kleer 
86a] with belief  functions  (e.g.,  [Laskey  and Lehner  891). 
Let  3  =  (PI,  P2,  . . . .  Pn }  be  the  set  of  (boolean) 
propositional  clauses  that  have  been  transmitted  to  the 
ATMS  (premises  are  specified  in  3  as “+  C” or  “+ 
lC”)5.  Let  (Al,  AZ, . . . . Ak}  be  a distinguished  set  of 
primitives  (i.e.,  assumptions)  such  that  either  Ai or TAi 
(or  both)  occurs  in 3.  Furthermore,  let  II3 contain  the 
following  (and only the following)  beliefs:  (a) for each Pi, 
“Pi (1)” is in IB, (b) for  each  Ai, “A; (m)  V  TAi  (1 -m)” 
is in lB6.  Then  for any literal  B (i.e., a primitive  Q or its 
negation 42)  occurring  in 3,  we can compute  BEL( lE3,  B) 
using  the  nogoods  and  the  label  associated  with  B  as a 
basis.  For  more details,  see [D’Ambrosio 87, 88; Laskey 
and Lehner  88,89;  Provan  89a, 89b]. 
3.  Uncertain  Reasoning 
The  specification  of  independent  beliefs.  The 
D-S  formalism  encourages  the  use  of  the  following 
methodology:  we first  identify  the “independent”  aspects 
of  the problem  at hand; and  then  we specify  a belief  for 
each of  the identified  aspects.  Therefore,  the purpose  of 
this section  is to show how we can use the belief  calculus 
for uncertain reasoning once  the independent aspects of the 
problem at hand have been  identljied. 
Example  6. (adapted  from  [Kong  861)  Two  sites A and 
B  are  connected  by  a  one-way  valve  which,  when 
working,  allows  water  to  flow  from  A  to  B.  The 
probability  that  this valve  is working  (i.e.,  not  blocked) 
is pl.  Similarly,  sites  B and C are  connected  by  a one- 
way valve  (with a working  probability  of ~2).  These  two 
valves work independently.  We have no information  as to 
whether there is any water going  into A or B or C, but we 
are interested  in whether  there  is any  water  in each  site. 
Therefore,  we formulate  the working  of the two valves as 
two independent  random  variables,  and 18 = {V  1  Working 
(pl)  V -7V1Working  (1-pl);  (VlWorking  +  (WaterA  + 
WaterB))  (1);  V2Working  (~2) v  TV2Working  (1-~2); 
(V2Working  +  (WaterB +  WaterC))  (1)) , and the values 
of  BEL(IB,  WaterA),  BEL(lB,  WaterB)  and  BEL(IB, 
WaterC) are zero at the moment. 
%‘he  ATMS  actually  uses  a  (positive)  primitive  to represent 
the negation  of  another  (positive)  primitive  [de  Kleer  86b]. 
However,  for  simplicity,  we  can  think of  the ATMS  as if  it 
accepted  a negated primitive directly. 
6A  more  general  specification  will be  to  specify  exactly  one 
of the following for Ai : “Ai (ml)  V T (l-ml)“,  “TAi (ml)  V T 
(l-ml)“,  or  “Ai  (ml)  V  TAi  (m2)  V  T  (1-ml-m2)”  (the 
specification of  “T (l-ml-m2)”  is optional). 
Suppose  we  just  learned  that  <WaterB>  =  <Yes>. 
Then  BEL(lE3 u  (WaterB  (1)))  WaterB)  =  1, BEL(lB  u 
(WaterB (l)),  WaterC) = p2, and BEL(IB u  (WaterB (l)}, 
WaterA) remains zero. 
Belief  dependency  structures.  In  general,  the 
uncertainties  we  want  to  specify  may  be  intuitively 
related.  When  this  is  the  case,  we  can  no  longer 
formulate  these  uncertainties  as  independent  random 
variables.  Nevertheless,  we  can  try  to  work  out  a 
dependency  structure  (in a sense similar  to the idea of the 
Bayesian  causal trees Cpearl861) among the variables,  and 
we make sure that the way a variable  (e.g., A) depends on 
a valuation  of other  variables  (e.g.,  (B = Yes)  A  (C =  h)) 
is  independent  of  the  ways  this  same  variable  (i.e.,  A) 
depends  on other  valuations  of these other  variables  (i.e., 
(B = Yes)  A  (C = m);  (B = No)  A  (C = 1); etc.).  This  is 
the rational  behind  the following  technique  which  uses a 
method described  in [Smets 781 for specifying  a belief  set 
from independent conditional  beliefs: 
Let  &  =  (Al,  AZ, . . .  , AN)  (e.g.,  (Bird,  Penguin, 
Fly})  be a set of  variables.  We  first  specify  a set  (II of 
categorical  beliefs  about  these  variables  (e.g.,  (I  = 
((Penguin  +  Bird  A  -Sly)  (1))).  Then,  we recursively 
apply  the  following  three  steps  until  the  variables 
contained  in Ai  (i 10)  do not directly  “depend on” each 
other. 
Step  1:  From  Ai  (e.g., &),  we  identify  exactly  one 
variable7  A (e.g., Fly) and also a subset 3Bi  of ai\  SO 
that  A  directly  “depends  on”  the  valuation  of  the 
elements  of Bi (e.g., So  = (Bird, Penguin}  is a subset of 
(Bird,  Penguin,  Fly)\{Fly)  so that Fly  directly  depends 
on the valuation  of the two variables  Bird and Penguin). 
Step  2:  For  each  and  every  logically  possible 
valuation  of the elements  of Bi  (e.g., <Bird,  Penguin>  = 
<Yes,  No>;  <Bird,  Penguin>  =  <Yes,  Yes>;  <Bird, 
Penguin>  = <No, No>),  we assess an independent  belief 
about the valuation  of A (e.g., we assess the belief  “(Fly 
=  Yes)  (.9)  V  ((Fly  = Yes)  v  (Fly  = No))  (.l)”  for  the 
valuation  <Bird,  Penguin>  =  <Yes,  No>).  If  this 
assessed  belief  is non-vacuous  and  non-categorical,  we 
(need to) translate  it into the following  beliefi 
(“the valuation”  +  A’s value is in ValueSetl)  (ml)  v 
(“the valuation”  +  A’s value  is in ValueSet2)  (m2) V 
.  .  . 
(“the valuation”  +  A’s value is in ValueSetM)  (mM), 
(e.g., “(Bird A  TPenguin  +  (Fly = Yes)) (.9)  V  (Bird  A 
TPenguin  +  (Fly = Yes) v  (Fly = No)) (.l)“, 
or simply,  “(Bird A  TPenguin  +  Fly)  (.9)  V  T (.l)“). 
7Actually,  we can identify more  than one variable if we want. 
Here, just  for simplicity,  we restrict  it to be one. 
*This  translation  is  based  on  the  principle  of  minimum 
specificity  [Dubois and Prade 861. 
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Penguin, Fly}\{ Fly)  = (Bird, Penguin]). 
Once  we  get  to  &.id,  we  can,  if  we  want,  specify  a 
(non-vacuous)  belief  for each of the variables  remaining 
in Afind  (e.g., &find  = A2  =  (Bird),  and we have  the 
option  of specifying  a belief  such as “Bird (.7)  V T (.3)” 
for the variable  Bird; however,  we prefer  to have  “T (1)” 
for Bird in this case). 
Example  8.  The  belief  set 
B  = ((Penguin  +  Bird A -J?ly)  (1); 
(Bird A TPenguin  +  Fly)  (.9)  v  T (. 1); 
(Bird +  -Penguin)  (.95) v  T (.05);) 
is obtained  from  the following  “constraints”: 
valuation  belief  about some variable 
Bird A -Penguin  Fly  (.9)  v  T (.l) 
Bird A Penguin  +lY  (1) 
lBird  A  -Penguin  T (1) 
--,Bird A  Penguin  (logically  impossible) 
Bird  TPenguin  (.95)  v  T (OS) 
-IBid  -Penguin  (1) 
Therefore,  BEL(lB  u  (Bird  (1)))  -1Penguin)  =  .95, 
BEL( IB u  (Bird  A  TPenguin  (1)))  Fly)  = .9, BEL(lJ3 u 
(Bird A  -Penguin  (1))) -Fly)  = 0, etc. 
In addition,  BEL(lB,  -;Penguin)  = .95, BEL(IB , Bird) = 
0,  BEL(lB  u  (Bird  (l)),  Fly)  =  855,  BEL(lB  u  (Bird 
(l)),  ~Fly)  = 0, BEL(lB  u  (Fly  (l)},  TPenguin)  =  1.0, 
BEL(lB  u  (Fly  (l)),  Bird)  =  0,  BEL(IB  u  (Fly  (l)), 
TBird) = 0, etc. 
“Distinct”  sources  of  evidence.  We  sometimes 
encounter  the  following  situationg:  (1)  there  are one  or 
more  sources  that provide  us with information,  and each 
source  has full  confidence  in the information  it provides; 
(2)  the  information  provided  by  each  source  directly 
“indicts”  some  elements  of  the  frame  of  the  “main 
variable”  (i.e.,  the  one  we  are  interested  in);  (3) we can 
make a reliability  estimation  for each  of these  sourceslo; 
(4) the reliabilities  of the sources are independent. 
When  we are  in this kind  of  situation,  we can put  our 
evidence  about each particular  source into a unique group, 
and we specify  a belief  dependency  structure according  to 
each group of (related)  evidence.  The resulting  belief  set, 
then,  consists  of  several  belief  dependency  structures 
intersecting  on the main variable. 
Example  7.  Our  friend  is  ill,  and  doctors  can  not 
pinpoint  the  problem.  Since  it  may  involve  life  and 
death, we bring our friend  to two doctors  B and C that are 
famous  in this area.  It is reasonable  to assume  that these 
9The  author  thanks  Nit  Wilson  and  Philippe  Smets  for 
arriving  at  this  characterization  of  distinctness. 
‘OA  source  is  reliable  (with  respect  to  the  information  it 
provides)  if the information it provides is indeed true. 
two  doctors  are  independent  in  making  their  diagnoses 
(because  they received  their trainings  in different  medical 
doctrines,  they  live  in different  cities,  they  do not confer 
to each other,  etc.).  We also  did some background  study 
about  the  two  doctors.  Therefore  we  know  that  B  is 
extremely  busy,  B has more  authority  in this area than C 
does,  and C has a reputation  of always  doing  his best for 
his  patients.  Also,  our  actual  experience  with  the  two 
doctors  seems  to  confirm  this  background  information. 
We  are  interested  in the  reliabilities  of  the  two  doctors. 
We are also concerned  that B’s being busy  may mean that 
B  does  not  spend  enough  time  examining  our  friend’s 
case.  Therefore  we  formulate  our  knowledge  about  the 
two doctors  as two belief  sets  IB  1 and lB  2, with each  IBi 
containing  our (intuitive)  beliefs  about a doctor: 
IB  1 = ((AuthorityB  A  BusyB)  (1); 
(BusyB +  LessCaseStudyB)  (8)  v 
(BusyB +  -LessCaseStudyB)  (.2); 
AuthorityB  A  LessCaseStudyB  +  ReliableB)  (.7)  V 
AuthorityB  A  LessCaseStudyB  +  -ReliableB)  (.3); 
(AuthorityB  A  -LessCaseStudyB  +  ReliableB)  (95)  V 
(AuthorityB  A ~LessCaseStudyB  +  -ReliableB)  (.05)) 
l6 2 = ((SemiAuthorityC  A  ReputationC)  (1); 
(SemiAuthorityC  A  ReputationC  +  ReliableC)  (.8)  V 
(SemiAuthorityC  A  ReputationC  +  -ReliableC)  (.2)) 
After  diagnosis,  doctor  B  determines  with  full 
confidence  that  the patient  has either  illness  X or illness 
Y.  Also  after  diagnosis,  doctor  C determines  with  full 
confidence  that the patient  has either  illness  Y or illness 
2.  It is a medical  fact that a person  can not have any two 
of these three illnesses  at the same time.  Therefore  we let 
the  frame  of  (the  main  variable)  Illness  to be  (X,  Y, Z, 
OTHER}, and we specify  three more categorical  beliefs: 
833 = ((BSaysXY  A  CSaysYZ)  (1); 
(BSaysXY  A  ReliableB  +  (Illness = Y)  V  (Illness  = Z)) 
(1); 
(CSaysYZ  A  ReliableC  +  (Illness  = Y)  V  (Illness  = Z)) 
(1)). 
With  IB = lB1 u  lB2 u  IB3, we get: BEL(&  (Illness  = 
X)) = 0; BEL(lB , (Illness  =  Z)) =  0;  BEL(lB,  (Illness  = 
Y))  =  .6; BEL(ll3,  (Illness  = X) v  (illness  = Y))  =  .75; 
BEL(  lB , (Illness  =  Y)  v  (Illness  = Z))  =  8;  BEL(lB , 
(Illness = X) v (Illness  = Y) v  (Illness = Z)) = -95, etc. 
4.  Discussion 
Appropriateness  of  the  notation.  The  belief 
calculus  serves as a (notational)  alternative  for the the use 
of  the  D-S  formalism  for  uncertain  reasoning.  As such, 
the appropriateness  of  the  belief  calculus  (as a notation) 
will have  to depend  on the application  domain,  and there 
may  well  be  situations  in  which  set-theoretic  notations 
are more appropriate. 
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superficial but nevertheless  important “difference” between 
the  (uses  of  the)  two  notations:  with  the belief  calculus, 
we can sometimes  explicitly  specify  what our evidence  is 
and how  this evidence  induces  beliefs;  whereas  with  the 
usual  set-theoretic  notations,  the  evidence  is  generally 
regarded as “outside of” our specifications  of beliefs. 
Tractability.  The  computational  complexity  of  the 
belief  calculus  is exponential  with respect  to the number 
of  variables  in  a  belief  set,  and  there  are  ways  for 
improving  the  speed  of  this  computation  (e.g.,  [Kennes 
and Smets 90; Shafer  et al. 87; Wilson  891). 
We might also look  at this complexity  problem  from  a 
different  perspective:  if we treat propositional  provability 
(which  is well  known  for  its  NP-completeness!)  as  the 
basic operator,  then the complexity  of  the belief  calculus 
is exponential  with respect  to the  number  of beliefs  in a 
belief  set.  Thus,  if  we  have  many  variables  but  only  a 
few beliefs in a belief set, then a deduction-based  approach 
such as ATMS  + D-S (see  movan  89b] for a complexity 
analysis  of  ATMS  +  D-S)  may  turn  out  to  be  a  more 
attractive  way for computing  BEL. 
5.  Conclusion 
We  formulated  the  D-S  formalism  along  the  lines  of 
natural  deduction  systems.  This  formulation  (called  the 
belief  calculus)  allows  us  to  infer  beliefs  from  beliefs 
without  ever  appealing  to  the  use  of  set-theoretic 
notations. 
To  show  how  the  belief  calculus  may  be  used  for 
uncertain  reasoning,  we  gave  three  examples.  These 
examples  suggested  different  ways  for  modelling  real 
world  situations. 
Acknowledgements.  The  author  thanks  Mike  Clarke, 
Robert  Kennes,  Alessandro  Saffiotti,  Philippe  Smets, and 
Nit  Wilson  for  stimulating  discussions,  and  two 
anonymous  referees  for very  helpful comments. 
References 
D’Ambrosio, B. (1987). Truth  maintenance  with numeric 
certainty  estimates. Proceedings  of the Third IEEE 
Conference  on AI Applications,  Orlando, Florida,  244- 
249. 
B’Ambrosio,  B. (1988). A hybrid approach  to reasoning 
under uncertainty. International Journal  of Approximate 
Reasoning,  2,  1,29-45. 
de Kleer, J. (1986a). An assumption-based  truth 
maintenance  system.  Artificial  Intelligence,  28,2, 
127- 162. 
de Kleer, J. (1986b). Extending  the ATMS. Artificial 
Intelligence,  28,  2,  163-196. 
Dubois, D. and Prade, H. (1986). The principle  of 
minimum  specificity  as a basis for evidential  reasoning. 
In Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based  Systems (Bouchon 
and Yager eds.), Springer-Verlag,  Berlin,  75-84. 
Fagin,  R. and Halpem,  J. Y. (1989). Uncertainty,  belief, 
and probability.  Proceedings  of the Eleventh 
International Joint Conference  on Artijicial Intelligence, 
Detroit,  Michigan,  Aug. 20-25,  1161-l 167. 
Gordon,  J. and Shortliffe,  E. H. (1984). The Dempster- 
Shafer theory of evidence.  In Rule-Based Expert 
Systems:  The  MYCIN  Experiments  of the Stanford 
Heuristic Programming  Project (Buchanan and 
Shortliffe  eds.), Addison-Wesley,  Reading, Mass., 272- 
292. 
Kennes,  R. and Smets, P. (1990).  Fast algorithms  for 
Dempster-Shafer  theory.  (submitted for publication). 
Kong, A. (1986). Multivariate  belief  functions  and 
graphical models. Doctoral  dissertation,  Department  of 
Statistics, Harvard University. 
Laskey,  K. B. and Lehner,  P. E. (1988). Belief 
maintenance: An integrated approach to uncertainty 
management.  Proceedings  of the Seventh AAA.I 
Conference,  Saint Paul,  Minnesota,  Aug. 21-26,210- 
214. 
Laskey,  K. B. and Lehner,  P. E. (1989).  Assumptions, 
beliefs  and probabilities.  Artificial Intelligence,  41,  1, 
65-77. 
Pearl, J. (1986). Fusion, propagation,  and structuring  in 
belief  networks.  Artificial Intelligence,  29,  241-288. 
Provan,  G. (1989a). An analysis  of ATMS-based 
techniques for computing Dempster-Shafer  belief 
functions. Proceedings  of the Eleventh International 
Joint Conference  on Artljkial  Intelligence,  Detroit, 
Michigan,  Aug. 20-25,  1115- 1120. 
Provan,  G. (1989b). A logic-based  analysis of Dempster 
Shafer theory.  Technical  Report  89-08, Computer 
Science  Dept., University  of British  Columbia. 
Ruspini,  E. H. (1987).  Epistemic  logics,  probability,  and 
the calculus of evidence.  Proceedings  of the Tenth 
International Joint Conference  on Artificial Intelligence. 
Shafer, G. (1976).  A Mathematical  Theory  of Evidence. 
Princeton  University  Press. 
Shafer,  G., Shenoy,  P. P. and Mellouli,  K. (1987). 
Propagating  belief  functions  in qualitative  Markov 
trees. International Journal  of Approximate Reasoning, 
1,  349-400. 
Smets, P. (1978). Un modele  mathematico-statistique 
simulant le processus  du diagnostic  medical. Doctoral 
dissertation, Universite  Libre de Bruxelles,  Bruxelles. 
Smets, P. (1988). Belief  functions.  In Non-Standard 
Logics for  Automated  Reasoning  (p.  Smets, E. H. 
Mamdani, D. Dubois and H. Prade eds.). Academic 
Press, London. 
Wilson, N. (1989). Justification,  computational  efficiency 
and generalisation  of the Dempster-Shafer  theory. 
Yen, J. (1989). Gertis:  A Dempster-Shafer  approach  to 
diagnosing  hierarchical  hypotheses.  Communications  of 
the  ACM,  32,  5,  573-585. 
Zarley,  D., Hsia, Y.-T., and Shafer,  G. (1988). Evidential 
reasoning  using DELIEF.  Proceedings  of the Seventh 
AAAI  Conference,  St. Paul,  Minnesota,  1, 205-209. 
HSIA  125 